Justin W. Aimonetti & Christian Talley · September 2020
88 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. Arguendo 175
Is the receipt of a single unsolicited, automated text message, sent in violation of a federal statute, a concrete injury in fact that establishes standing to sue in federal court? Judges nationwide have split over that deceptively simple question. The Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits consider such intrusions sufficiently concrete to support Article III standing. Yet the Eleventh Circuit recently held that the alleged injury from an unwanted text’s “chirp, buzz, or blink” is insufficiently concrete to invoke federal jurisdiction. Surprisingly, given the advent of widespread, unwelcome “robotexts,” scholars have yet to analyze this burgeoning divide, the ultimate resolution of which likely will require Supreme Court review. This Essay bridges that gap. Surveying both sides of the split, it contends that a single unsolicited, automated text sent in violation of a federal statute is a concrete injury in fact. In so doing, this Essay exposes the flawed reasoning that led the Eleventh Circuit to deny Article III standing. In response, it proposes three solutions to rectify the Eleventh Circuit’s demonstrably erroneous decision.