Case No. 17-1672, 10th Cir.
Preview by John Hindley
Haymond puts front and center the competing values of retributive justice for those who are guilty of the heinous crime of possessing child pornography and upholding the constitutional rights of the accused.
Andre Ralph Haymond was found guilty of possessing child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2012). Subsequently, he was sentenced to 38 months in prison, which was within the statutory requirement of a sentence of no more than 10 years, see id. § 2252(b)(2), and 10 years of supervised release, see id. § 3583(k). As part of his supervised release, Haymond was required to, inter alia, register his name in the national sex offender registry, not commit a federal, state, or local crime, or view or possess child pornography. Brief for the United States at 8, United States v. Haymond, No. 17-1672 (U.S. filed Dec. 17, 2018). In October 2015, about two years after being released from prison, a probation officer found child pornography on Haymond’s phone.
The district court judge later found by a preponderance of the evidence that this constituted a violation of Haymond’s release. His punishment: another five years of prison followed by five years of supervised release. See Brief for Respondent at 8, United States v. Haymond, 17-1672 (U.S. filed Jan 18, 2019). Breaching the supervised release of a Class C felony, which includes possessing child pornography, imposes a prison sentence of two years, according to the relevant statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). In 2003, however, Congress added § 3583(k), which specifically addresses sex offenders, and gives discretion to district court judges to sentence defendants to a minimum of five years and up to life in prison for committing another sex offense. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, § 141(e)(2), 120 Stat. 587, 603. It is worth noting that Haymond’s sentence for breaching his supervisory release was longer than his original sentence. Haymond appealed his sentence to the Tenth Circuit, arguing that § 3583(k) violates his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because (1) it takes away “the sentencing judge[’s] discretion to impose a punishment within the statutorily prescribed range” and (2) it punishes him for new conduct without being convicted by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Brief of Respondent in Opposition at 11, United States v. Haymond, 17-1672 (U.S. filed Sept. 13, 2018).
The Tenth Circuit agreed with Haymond, holding that the statute is “unconstitutional and unenforceable” because it required a judge, and not a jury, to find facts in order to impose a mandatory sentence on the defendant for subsequent conduct. See United States v. Haymond, 869 F.3d 1153, 1160, 1168 (10th Cir. 2017). Ultimately, the court excised the offending provision in § 3583(k). See id. at 1168. To support its holding, the Tenth Circuit relied heavily on United States v. Booker, in which the Supreme Court held that the federal sentencing guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment because they allowed a judge to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, additional facts in order to impose longer sentences in addition to the jail time that was already required by the original offense of which the defendant was found guilty by a jury. See 543 U.S. 220, 226–27 (2005). The Tenth Circuit remanded the case so the defendant could be sentenced only under § 3583(e)(3). See Haymond, 869 F.3d at 1168.
The United States appealed, arguing that Court jurisprudence draws a line between facts “relevant to the imposition of a sentence,” where a defendant is entitled to a jury, and facts “relevant to the administration of a sentence,” where there is no right to a jury. Brief for the United States at 23–24, Haymond, 17-1672 (U.S. filed Dec. 17, 2018). In other words, the jury right extends to “criminal prosecutions,” which do not include the sentencing for a supervisory release violation. Id. at 24–28 (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI). According to the government, “Congress was entitled to identify certain types of supervised-release violations following convictions” that could receive harsher penalties. Id. at 22.
What is peculiar about this case is that the Court granted certiorari even though there is not a circuit split on the matter. This is not a frequently litigated issue and no other circuit has questioned the constitutionality of the statute. See Brief of Respondent in Opposition at 20–23, Haymond, 17-1672 (U.S. filed Sept. 13, 2018).