Case Nos. 18-1584 & 18-1587 | 4th Cir.
Preview by Taylor Dowd, Senior Online Editor
Is the Appalachian Trail, the 2,200-mile-long stretch running from Georgia to Maine, “land,” or just a footpath traversing land?
The Appalachian Trail is administered by the National Park Service, but the trail lands are not exclusively federally owned. The Mineral Leasing Act authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to grant “[r]ights-of-way through any Federal lands” for “pipeline[s]” that “transport[] oil, natural gas, synthetic liquid or gaseous fuels.” 30 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2018). Under the statute, “Federal lands” does not include lands in the National Park System. Id. § 185(b)(1).
One of the petitioners, Atlantic Coast Pipeline LCC, applied to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) in 2015 to build a natural-gas pipeline from West Virginia to North Carolina that would cross the Appalachian Trail.
Respondents, environmental organizations, challenged the proposal through comments to FERC, but The National Forest Service granted the right-of-way under the Mineral Leasing Act. The Fourth Circuit agreed with Respondents, finding the grant of the right-of-way improper because of noncompliance with environmental standards, the availability of alternative routes, and failure to properly consider environmental risks. Lastly, and mostly importantly for the case in front of the Supreme Court, the Fourth Circuit held that the Forest Service lacks statutory authority to grant rights-of-way for pipelines through the Appalachian Trail under the Mineral Leasing Act. Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 911 F.3d 150, 179 (4th Cir. 2018). It concluded that the lands the Appalachian Trail passes through are National Park System lands, and therefore do not fall under the Mineral Leasing Act’s authorization to the Secretary of the Interior. See id. at 180.
Atlantic Coast Pipeline argues that this conflicts with the National Trails System Act, which it argues confirms the jurisdiction of federal agencies over federal lands through which a trail passes. Brief for Petitioner at 21–27, Atl. Coast Pipeline, LLC v. Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n, No. 18-1587 (U.S. filed Dec. 2, 2019). The Petitioner also expresses doubt that Congress would intend to use these provisions to create a barrier for natural gas resources reaching the coast because it “neither hides elephants in mouseholes nor buries major obstacles to economic development in definitional provisions.” Id. at 41 (citing Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)).
The Respondents argue that the Appalachian Trail must be “land.” They explain that the nearly 240,000 acres comprising the trail must be considered land because it clearly a “National Park System Unit,” which is defined using the term “land.” Brief for Respondents at 22, 30, U.S. Forest Serv. v. Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n; Atl. Coast Pipeline, LCC v. Cowpasture River Pres. Ass’n, Nos. 18-1584 & 18-1587 (U.S. filed Jan. 15, 2020). The Respondents also reject any distinction between “footpaths” and “land,” arguing simply that “[l]and is what you walk on.” Id. at 3.