Case No. 19-715 | D.C. Cir.
Case No. 19-760 | 2d Cir.
May 12, 2020
Preview by Jacob Reiskin, Online Editor
The Court will answer in Mazars and Deutsche Bank whether the House of Representatives has the power to subpoena personal and business financial records of President Trump and the Trump organization. Both the Second Circuit and the D.C. Circuit held that Congress has the authority to do so. See Trump v. Deutsche Bank AG, 943 F.3d 627 (2d Cir. 2019); Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, 940 F.3d 710 (2019).
The House Oversight Committee, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and Committee on Financial Services all issued subpoenas to financial institutions connected to the Trump family. This included Mazars USA, the President’s accountant, Deutsche Bank (now of infamy because of Russian money laundering and questionable loans to the Trump organization), and Capital One. The President intervened to quash the subpoenas.
The President argues that this is a separation of powers case and that Congress’ subpoena power is restricted to legislative purposes. See Brief for Petitioner at 33, Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, Nos. 19-715 &19-760 (U.S. filed Jan. 27, 2020). The President insists that the subpoenas of the President and his family’s records have nothing to do with legislation because it is law enforcement inquiry related to money laundering and financial crimes. Declining to mention that his family holds senior roles in the White House and the Trump organization, the President argues that he and his family should not be a “congressional ‘case study.’” Id. at 20. The President adds that Congress does not have the power to regulate the office of the President, a coequal branch of government, especially without legislative purpose. The Solicitor General backs the President on this point. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10–13, Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, Nos. 19-175 & 19760 (U.S. filed Jan. 27, 2020).
In response, the House of Representatives argues unequivocally that each of the committees had a legislative purpose to the subpoenas: The Financial Services Committee is hoping to counter illicit banking schemes, the Intelligence Committee has broad authority to legislate against external and internal threats to the US and to prevent interference by foreign governments, and the Oversight Committee hopes to consider legislation pertaining to the President’s conflicts of interest and Emoluments clause violations. See Brief for Respondent at 14–30, Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, Nos. 19-715 & 19-760 (U.S. filed Feb. 26, 2020). Though the House concedes that the President may object to subpoenas that impair his ability to run the executive branch, Congress argues no grounds for such an objection exist here. Citing a Nixon case concerning surrendering privacy in exchange for public office, The House of Representatives wrote: “The fact that the President is the principal owner of the Trump Organization cannot provide it immunity from Congressional investigation.” Brief for Respondent at 65 (citing Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 455 (1977).
Both parties also disagree about whether the House rules allow for subpoenaing the President, but the larger point of disagreement is whether the subpoenas were permissible as legislative tools, for which Congress has broad authority. The President argues for a strict test for determining legislative intent in separation of powers cases concerning document requests against the President. On the other hand, the House of Representatives argues that judicial supervision of Congress is inappropriate and inconsistent with a rich history of legislative inquiry, and also with existing laws concerning presidential financial disclosures.