Case No. 18-6662 | 11th Cir.
Preview by Sean Lowry, Online Editor*
The question presented in Shular is whether the determination of a “serious drug offense” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) requires the same categorical approach used in the determination of a “violent felony” under the ACCA.
The ACCA imposes a mandatory minimum term of 15 years in prison for anyone convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which includes possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, if the defendant has three prior convictions for a “serious drug offense” or a “violent felony.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Courts have interpreted these statutory terms through the “categorical approach” announced by the Court in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). Under the categorical approach, courts look to the statutory elements of an offense, rather than the facts of the defendant’s actual conduct, when determining whether a prior conviction meets the statutory definition for enhanced prison term sentences.
Eddie Lee Shular pled guilty to possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon in violation of § 922(g). He was classified as an “armed career criminal” because of six prior Florida convictions for controlled substance offenses. At the district court, Shular objected to this classification. None of the Florida statutes used to convict Shular contained a mens rea element, so there was not a determination of whether he had knowledge that he sold controlled substances. Thus, according to Shular’s counsel, none of Shular’s Florida convictions would qualify as a “serious drug offense” under the categorical approach because the Florida crimes are broader than the generic drug analogues which require a mens rea element.
However, the district court overruled Shular’s objection and sentenced him to prison for the mandatory minimum of 15 years. The Eleventh Circuit applied its prior precedent in United States v. Smith, 775 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2014), deciding that the categorical approach did not apply to the determination of “serious drug offenses.” Under Smith, the Eleventh Circuit does not use the categorical approach in defining serious drug offenses because the plain language of the ACCA definition “require[s] only that the predicate offense ‘involv[es]’ . . . certain activities related to controlled substances.” Id. at 1267.
In its petition and brief to the Court, counsel for Shular argue that the Eleventh Circuit’s approach conflicts with the Third, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, which do use the categorical approach for determining a serious drug offense under the ACCA. These circuits compare the elements of the prior state drug conviction with the elements of the generic drug crime. Counsel for Shular claim that at least three other circuits other than the Eleventh Circuit reject the categorical approach in these instances, creating a three to four split.
The Solicitor General argues that the definition of “serious drug offense” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) does not include a mens rea component. Because the state law that was used to convict Shular regulated a controlled substance and involved the manufacture, distribution, or possession with intent to distribute or manufacture those substances, according to the Solicitor General, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision was correct. According to this view, the federal law definition does not include mens rea as to the exact nature of the substances manufactured, distributed, or possessed by a defendant.
*Sean Lowry is a 3LE (Class of 2021) and Analyst in Public Finance at the Congressional Research Service (CRS). The views expressed are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Library of Congress or CRS.