Reasonable Doubt: In Law the Highest Burden—In Fact Barely a Burden

For hundreds of years, the legal field has disagreed about whether to define the criminal burden of proof “beyond a reasonable doubt,” and if so, how best to define it. As a result, courts have traditionally left the phrase undefined— an approach endorsed by the Supreme Court. It seems odd that one of the fundamental components of our criminal justice system is treated inconsistently across the nation’s courts. This inconsistency is particularly bizarre given that empirical studies have shown that both state and federal judges have a uniform understanding of the protection reasonable doubt affords defendants. Unfortunately, empirical studies of potential jurors have demonstrated that some definitions of reasonable doubt, and the failure to define reasonable doubt at all, lead jurors to believe that the burden of proof is much lower than judges believe the burden is. For example, studies suggest that juries, given no definition of reasonable doubt at all, find the burden to be almost half as strong as what judges believe it to be. Jury verdicts reached under this misunderstood standard can potentially lead to false convictions and deny defendants the protection of the Due Process Clause. This Note advocates that defining reasonable doubt is the best way to effectuate the protection defendants are owed under the Due Process Clause. Alternatively, courts can effectuate reasonable doubt’s protection through a “principle conferring” approach—by informing jurors of the principles behind reasonable doubt that have been accepted by the Supreme Court.