Ross C. Paolino · August 2008
76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1392 (2008)
In the summer of 2004, a slow-moving Category Three hurricane struck the heart of New Orleans, Louisiana. The hurricane engulfed New Orleans in catastrophic flooding, placing homes, hospitals, and nursing homes completely under water. The hurricane killed thousands of residents, displaced hundreds of thousands more, and incapacitated responders at every level of government. To make matters worse, thousands of residents evacuated to the New Orleans Superdome, only to meet horrific and desperate living conditions.
The hurricane that “struck” New Orleans in the summer of 2004 was not really a hurricane at all. “Hurricane Pam” was actually a catastrophic hypothetical disaster scenario designed to frame discussion and identify operational concerns in hopes of developing an extensive “catastrophic hurricane plan” for Louisiana. The eerily striking similarities between “Hurricane Pam” and Hurricane Katrina are not coincidental—the details of “Hurricane Pam” were specific formal concerns and recommendations raised after the hypothetical exercise. “Hurricane Pam” provided the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) with explicit notice that a major hurricane striking New Orleans would undeniably overwhelm state and local governments and suggested the need for a coordinated federal response. Unfortunately, despite these dire warnings, the nation’s response to Hurricane Katrina failed miserably.
Hurricane Katrina annihilated the Gulf Coast in the summer of 2005. Qualifying as the worst natural disaster in U.S. history, the storm took more than 1,300 lives, destroyed more than 300,000 homes, and left a financial toll estimated at over $100 billion. Along with the extensive damage throughout the Gulf Coast, and the mammoth economic costs associated with the storm, Hurricane Katrina obliterated the nation’s sense of security in the government’s ability to deal with disasters of this magnitude.
When the federal government’s coordination and preparation failed in the face of a predicted and anticipated major hurricane, society demanded action to ensure such gross inadequacies would no longer threaten the nation’s preparedness. The blame for the inefficiencies after Hurricane Katrina do not lie solely on local, state, or federal authorities—Katrina unearthed massive government failure at all levels.
Although the country and the federal government argue for a greater federal role in handling disasters, such a desire runs contrary to the nation’s traditional federalism-based approach to disaster response. The federal government’s historical role in disaster response, primarily guided by the Stafford Act, supplements state and local resources at the request of state and local governments, and places primary disaster relief responsibility on state and local governments. This current federalism-based system, however, was blamed as the primary culprit for the inefficiencies resulting from Katrina, and ignited debate regarding how to increase the federal government’s role in these situations. This Essay examines whether FEMA can interpret the Stafford Act to respond to the post-Katrina call for a broader federal role in disaster relief. In answering this inquiry in the negative, this Essay maintains that such an empowering interpretation will not receive Chevron deference. Moreover, despite FEMA’s inept response to Hurricane Katrina, increasing federal disaster power is not the solution, as the federal government already possesses the necessary power to effectively respond to natural disasters.
Part I of this Essay describes the inefficiencies and power struggles between federal, state, and local governments during Hurricane Katrina. Part II discusses the relevant statutory authority that guides the nation’s disaster response scheme. Finally, Part III discusses the call for a greater federal role in disaster relief and concludes that expanding this role through agency interpretation of the Stafford Act will fail, and not receive Chevron deference. Part III also discusses the misplaced motivations for a greater federal role and argues the federal government already possesses adequate power to respond to future disasters.
