Case Nos. 19-267 & 19-348 | 9th Cir.
May 11, 2020
Preview by Summer Flowers, Senior Notes Editor
In Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Agnes Morrissey-Berru and St. James School v. Biel, the Supreme Court will determine the scope of the ministerial exception to employment discrimination claims. The ministerial exception, founded in both the Establishment and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, prohibits the government from interfering “with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers.” Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 181 (2012). This exception bars religious employees from bringing employment discrimination lawsuits against religious organizations. In this case, the Court is being asked to more clearly define the test to determine whether an employee of a religious institution is a “minister” for the purposes of the ministerial exception.
In these cases, St. James Catholic School fired Biel after she was diagnosed with breast cancer, and Our Lady of Guadalupe School fired Morrissey-Berru when she was in her sixties. Both teachers taught fifth grade and neither teacher had a religious degree. After they were fired, both teachers filed discrimination claims with the EEOC and sued their schools. Neither St. James Catholic School nor Our Lady of Guadalupe School “advanced a religious reason for firing” these teachers. Brief for Respondents at 14, Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, Nos. 19-267 & 19-348 (U.S. filed March 4, 2020). In both of these cases, the district court granted summary judgment for the schools, holding that the ministerial exception barred the teacher’s claims. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the teachers were not ministers and allowed the employment discrimination claims to proceed. The religious schools sought certiorari.
Petitioners St. James Catholic School and Our Lady of Guadalupe School state the question presented as whether civil courts can hear “employment discrimination claims brought by an employee against her religious employer, where the employee carried out important religious functions.” Brief of Petitioners at i, Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, Nos. 19-267 & 19-348 (U.S. filed Feb. 3, 2020). Petitioners argue that Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court case establishing the ministerial exception, supports a functional approach to determining when the ministerial exception applies. They argue the teachers here (1) “carried out the important religious function of teaching the Catholic faith to the next generation,” (2) had religiously significant titles, and (3) had “religious training.” Id. at 45–52. Accordingly, Petitioners argue the teachers fall “within the ministerial exception” and are barred from bringing their employment discrimination claims against their religious employer. Id. at 47.
Respondents Morrissey-Berru and Biel, however, frame the issue as “[w]hether the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses prohibit lay teachers at religious elementary schools from bringing employment discrimination claims.” Brief for Respondents at i. They argue that Hosanna-Tabor established a “framework for assessing ministerial status,” which includes religious “titles, training, and whether [the employees] hold themselves out as spiritual leaders.” Id. at 15. Respondents argue that none of the factors established by Hosanna-Tabor apply to them, and thus they are not ministers and are not barred by the ministerial exception from bringing employment discrimination claims against their schools.
This case has important implications in determining the scope of protection from employment discrimination suits under the ministerial exception. If employers can define roles and religious titles such that mostly secular employees are covered by the ministerial exception, it may undercut employee protections. But if truly religious employees can avoid falling under the exception, the ministerial exception could be rendered useless for religious employers.