Welcome to the second year of On the Docket’s Supreme Court Previews! Started last year, with the Court’s October 2015 term, two members of the Law Review’s online team began writing monthly previews. Drawing from primary and secondary sources, each month the online team puts together previews of the cases that will be heard by the Court in the upcoming month. This year, we’re proud to have expanded our online editorial team to ensure that the Court’s cases receive due attention for each and every argument. Our case previews continue throughout the year, even while decisions are being announced, to provide you with a comprehensive view of what is on the Court’s docket every month.
What follows is On the Docket’s preview of the Supreme Court’s October docket. We’ve broken down the cases for you, explained the key facts and legal principles involved, and outlined the significance of the outcome. Read on to familiarize yourself with the coming arguments, and as always, don’t forget to check back for analysis and commentary from practitioners and prominent legal scholars when opinions are announced! If you are a scholar or practitioner in the field and are interested in writing a response piece, please reach out to Talya Bobick, the Law Review’s Senior Online Editor at trbobick@law.gwu.edu.
Enjoy this month’s rendition of Previews by On the Docket!
October 4
Bravo-Fernandez v. United States
No. 15-537; 1st Cir.
The petitioners in this case, Juan Bravo-Fernandez and Hector Martinez-Maldonado, were charged in June 2010 with bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666, conspiracy to violate § 666, and interstate travel to aid in violating § 666. A jury acquitted them of conspiracy and traveling interstate to aid violating § 666 but convicted them on the § 666 bribery charges. Petitioners appealed their convictions, and the First Circuit vacated the convictions, because at trial the jurors had been instructed that they could find the defendants guilty of conduct that the bribery statute under which the defendants were charged did not prohibit. The First Circuit remanded the case to the district court where the government sought to retry the bribery charges.
After a series of procedural happenings, the petitioners moved to preclude the retrial of the bribery charges based on the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Double Jeopardy Clause not only prevents a defendant from being retried on the same charge, but also prevents an issue from being retried after a jury has found the issue in the defendant’s favor in a trial that resulted in an acquittal. The petitioners argued in their motion that, because the jury had acquitted them of conspiracy to violate § 666 and traveling interstate to aid in violating § 666, the issue of their potential bribery in violation of § 666 was precluded, so the § 666 bribery charges could not be retried after the First Circuit vacated the convictions.
The district court denied the petitioners’ motion, and the First Circuit affirmed, explaining that the jury verdict that included the acquittals and convictions was inconsistent, because in this case, a reasonable jury could not have found that the defendants were guilty of bribery but not guilty of conspiring to bride and traveling interstate to further the bribery. The First Circuit explained that acquittals that were part of an inconsistent jury verdict did not have preclusive effects on issues that the jury decided, because in such a verdict a court cannot know which of the verdicts it should accept as authoritative regarding how the jury decided factual issues that were inconsistently decided. The petitioners petitioned for certiorari and the Court granted it to decide whether a conviction that is both vacated and unconstitutional can negate the preclusive effect of an acquittal under the Double Jeopardy clause.
At the Supreme Court, the petitioners argue that an acquittal still precludes retrial of an issue that the acquitting jury found in the defendant’s favor even if the jury also returned an inconsistent conviction that has been vacated. They contend that because Supreme Court precedent dictates that a hung jury does not nullify an acquittal’s preclusive effect, neither should a vacated conviction, because both a hung jury and a vacated conviction are “legal nullities” which should not affect an acquittal’s preclusion of a retrial of an issue. They also argue that, under Court precedent that prohibits overturning a conviction based on a valid acquittal in the same case that is inconsistent with the conviction, a valid verdict cannot be used to question another valid verdict. Therefore, they argue, neither should an invalid verdict—here the vacated convictions—be used to question a valid verdict, such as the acquittal in this case. Finally, the petitioners maintain that allowing retrial here would go against the principle that a vacated conviction is equivalent to a clean slate and they contend that allowing a retrial would lead to a rise in prosecutorial abuse.
The United States, as the respondents, argue that the acquittals should not preclude retrial of the charges for which the petitioners were convicted. Because the jury returned inconsistent acquittal and conviction verdicts, the United States reasons, a court cannot determine if the jury decided issues in the petitioners’ favor in the acquittals, so a court cannot decide whether any issues should be precluded from retrial. The United States also insists that the fact that the convictions were vacated does not mean a court cannot consider those convictions when determining what a jury decided and if a jury decided an issue in the defendant’s favor as part of an acquittal. Finally, the United States attempts to discredit the petitioners’ argument about potential for prosecutorial abuse, while arguing that it is important to allow courts to retry convictions that have been vacated because a vacated sentence does not always mean that the defendant did not commit the crime.
This case will have an obvious impact on the petitioners, whose futures rely on the outcome. The case also has the potential to impact numerous other defendants in the future who may have been acquitted of some charges but who have had convictions of other charges in the same trial vacated and face the possibility of retrial. Because such a situation involves many factors—inconsistent jury verdicts, convictions that have been vacated, the government deciding to retry some charges—instances in which this case may come into play in the future may be rare. However, for those defendants who do face such a situation in the future, the outcome of this case will be incredibly important.
Shaw v. United States
No. 15-5991; 9th Cir.
Lawrence Shaw thought he had hit the jackpot, literally. He was living with a woman who was in charge of forwarding someone else’s mail – which included bank statements. That someone else was Stanley Hsu, a U.S. citizen who had returned to his home country of Taiwan. During his time in the United States, Hsu opened a bank account with Bank of America. Shaw opened a bank statement and discovered that during Hsu’s time in the United States, Hsu had accumulated over $300,000 in this account. Lawrence Shaw decided that he wanted this money, and hatched a plan to get it.
Using the information obtained from Hsu’s mail, Shaw opened up a PayPal account in Hsu’s name. He then used this PayPal account to transfer $307,00 from the Bank of America account into Shaw’s own Washington Mutual bank account. Hsu unfortunately did not realize the transfers were occurring until it was too late – it was past the 60-day grace period to report fraudulent transactions. Hsu only recovered about $240,000.
Shaw was discovered and charged under 18 U.S.C. §1344(1): the federal bank fraud statute which prohibits schemes to “defraud a financial institution.” When the case went to trial, Shaw’s strategy was simple. Shaw admitted his part in the scheme, but claims that he only intended to defraud Hsu, not either of the banks involved. His defense rests on a plain text reading of the statute – in order to convict him, the prosecution needs to show that he intended to defraud the bank itself as the primary victim. Shaw requested such a jury instruction, but was denied and convicted under the statute. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld his conviction.
Shaw contends that if Congress wanted to differentiate money or property that belonged to the bank instead of just in the banks control, it could have as it did in the second clause of the statute, which deals with false representation as a mean of defrauding a bank. The U.S. government disagrees with Shaw’s method of interpretation – they point to legislative history, that reveals that Congress rejected a version of 18 U.S.C. §1344(1) which would have required an intent to cause the bank to lose money. In this battle of a plain text interpretation against contextual analysis, the Court will surely miss the presence of the late Justice Scalia.
October 5
Salman v. United States
No. 15-628; 9th Cir.
Maher Kara became a healthcare investment banker at Citigroup in 2002. Soon after, he started asking his brother with a background in chemistry, Michael, questions about the scientific aspects of his work. Michael then became engaged to Basam Salman’s sister. Basam and Michael talked about the information that Maher was disclosing to Michael, and Basam increased his trading account to over $2 million. The federal government caught on to him when he started making trades that were identical to those being made by Citigroup, and charged him with insider trading.
A Chicago-based wholesale grocer, Basam was charged in the Ninth Circuit – a court that had not yet taken a stance on the 1983 Supreme Court-decision in Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commission. In Dirks, the Court set forth the standard for when a recipient of confidential information, or a “tippee,” may be convicted for insider trading: when the tipper directly or indirectly benefited from the initial disclosure of sensitive information. The Second Circuit had interpreted the language of the Court to conclude that friendship alone is insufficient proof to demonstrate that a benefit was gained by the tipper. The Ninth Circuit, however, reached a conclusion similar to that of the First Circuit. The First Circuit found that a combination of being appreciated by his friends and the expectations of monetary showings of gratitude, such as dinners and tickets, was sufficient to demonstrate a benefit to the tipper. The Ninth Circuit opinion rested on the fact that the court felt that the government had demonstrated that the disclosure of confidential information was meant as a gift.
Basam implores the Court to accept a reasoning and interpretation of Dirks similar to that of the Second Circuit, and require a tangible, if even pecuniary, gain. Resting on constitutional principles, Basam argues that any other rule would violate the separation between courts and Congress as well as due process. Basam proffers that the Courts have already read insider trading to be contained with Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act, where no such literal words appear. Further, Basam argues, the government’s proposed rule of extending liability for insider trading to tippees when the information is made as a gift to a friend would not provide notice to the person acting on the knowledge, as due process requires. The government admits that Section 10(b) is too broad – but claims that it was written that way to capture a wide range of illicit activity. The government relies on the principle of Congressional acceptance – where the fact that Congress has amended the statute, but not that section, since courts have read insider trading into Section 10(b) means that Congress approves of the courts’ interpretation.
This case is one of only five cases that was accepted for this term before the passing of the late Justice Scalia. However, three of the remaining four have not yet been set for oral argument, perhaps in order to avoid a four-four tie. The fact that this case has been set for oral argument early in the term might be an indication that this case might not be a close decision by the Justices.
Buck v. Davis
No. 15-8049; 5th Cir.
Buck v. Davis fits squarely within the ongoing national conversation on race and criminal justice, and its underlying facts are likely to strike a nerve regardless of where you stand in the often heated debate. To some, the case will be an example of our biased legal system invoking obtuse procedural rules to deny Black Americans their basic civil liberties. To others, it will exemplify an ineffective American bureaucracy that allows violent and remorseless criminals to escape execution through an endless cycle of post-conviction appeals. The Supreme Court will once again weigh in on the matter when it hears arguments during the first week of the 2016 term.
In 1996, Houston man Duane Buck was convicted of capital murder after he shot and killed his ex-girlfriend, Debra Gardner, and a man with whom he believed she was sleeping. Gardner’s death was particularly brutal and occurred in the street outside her home while her children were present. Buck was apprehended at the scene, and the arresting officer testified that he laughed and joked about the slaying while in the police cruiser, stating that “[t]he bitch got what she deserved.”
What appeared to be an open and shut case took a controversial turn during the sentencing phase of Buck’s trial. Buck’s court-appointed defense team had retained a psychiatrist named Dr. Walter Quijano to prepare a report about Buck’s potential for future violence, which was a central disputed factor in whether Buck would face the death penalty. Dr. Quijano’s report claimed that, among other reasons, Buck was more likely to be violent because he was a black man. Despite having this report in advance, Buck’s attorney inexplicably called upon Dr. Quijano to testify, elicited statements from the doctor reaffirming his findings, and introduced the entire report into evidence. The jury requested a copy of the report during their deliberations before ultimately finding that Buck was indeed likely to pose a future danger, and Buck was sentenced to death.
Buck’s sentence was affirmed on direct appeal, and in 1999, his newly appointed attorney filed a habeas petition in Texas state court claiming that Buck had been denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The petition cited non-existent portions of the Texas Penal Code and did not challenge the introduction of Dr. Quijano’s racially based testimony, the court quickly dismissed it as frivolous. A year later, however, another case in which Dr. Quijano had given similar testimony was appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Current Senator John Cornyn, who was Texas Attorney General at the time, conceded error while the case was pending, stating that the “infusion of race as a factor for the jury to weigh in making its determination violated [the defendant’s] constitutional right to be sentenced without regard to the color of his skin.” The case was vacated and remanded, and Cornyn soon after released a statement indicating that the State would not oppose resentencing in six other cases in which Dr. Quijano had testified, including Buck’s.
The State kept its word in five of the six cases, waiving all procedural defenses and conceding to resentencing. In Buck’s case, however, the state opposed resentencing, arguing that he was procedurally barred from raising a claim based on Dr. Quijano’s testimony because he had failed to do so in his first state petition for post-conviction relief. When pressed as to why Buck’s case was difference, the State claimed that it was only in Buck’s case that the defense rather than the prosecution introduced Dr. Quijano’s testimony, though Buck (through yet another new attorney) disputes this claim. The federal district court dismissed the case, agreeing that it was procedurally barred, and the Fifth Circuit refused to grant Buck a certification to appeal.
Buck has fought extensively for post-conviction relief in the years since, and the Supreme Court has denied certiorari to two of his previous petitions. Then in 2013, while still another of Buck’s petitions was pending before a Texas state court, the Supreme Court held in Trevino v. Thaler that the procedural bar at issue in cases like Buck’s could be overcome by a showing that the petitioner did not have effective assistance of counsel during his first petition habeas petition. Buck raised just such a claim in a new federal petition, but the district court again dismissed it, finding that Dr. Quijano’s testimony did not have a significant effect on the jury. The Fifth Circuit once again denied Buck certification to appeal, but this time, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Now, twenty years after his initial conviction, the Supreme Court will decide if Buck is entitled to an appeal of his sentencing based on Dr. Quijano’s racially charged testimony. Only time will tell, however, if the decision will finally spell resolution for this controversy two decades in the making.
Manuel v. City of Joliet
No. 14-9496; 7th Cir.
On a night that likely started out like any other, Elijah Manuel and his brother were driving through Joliet, Illinois. While driving, they were pulled over for failing to use a signal before turning. During the stop, a police officer came to Manuel’s door, opened it, pulled him out of the car, pushed him to the ground, and proceeded to punch and kick him. A search of Manuel turned up a bottle of pills, but a field test that the officers conducted on the pills came back negative. Regardless, the officers arrested Manuel and brought him back to the station where the pills were tested again, and again, came back negative. However, the technician who tested the pills falsely reported that one of the pills tested “positive for the probable presence of ecstasy,” and one of the arresting officer stated that “[f]rom [his] training and experience, [he] knew the pills to be ecstasy.” Manuel was charged with possession of a controlled substance and indicted approximately two weeks later.
Although a later police lab test on the pills once again came back negative, the prosecutor either did not receive these results or did not act on them until Manuel’s defense attorney requested the results of all lab tests done on the pills. After this request, the prosecutor, responding to the negative results in the latest test, moved to dismiss the charges against Manuel, and the court granted the motion. Manuel was released after spending forty-seven days in jail. This time in jail caused Manuel to suffer a variety of traumatic emotional and mental injuries, and it caused him significant financial and personal hardship, including the loss of his apartment.
On April 22, 2013, Manuel sued numerous police officers and the City of Joliet under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging among other claims, a claim for malicious prosecution based on the police making false reports and statements that resulted in his forty-seven days in jail. The defendants, Petitioners in this case, filed a motion to dismiss the charges, claiming that Manuel had filed his claims after the limitations period had expired. This was true for all of the claims except the malicious prosecution claim, the limitations period of which does not start upon arrest, but rather when “criminal proceedings have terminated in the plaintiff’s favor.” Despite this, the district court dismissed the malicious prosecution claim along with the other claims, explaining that Seventh Circuit precedent did not allow a malicious prosecution claim to be brought under the Fourth Amendment. Manuel appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which recognized that he had a sound argument, but nonetheless affirmed the district court’s dismissal, though noting that his argument was appropriate for Supreme Court review. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a malicious prosecution claim can be brought under the Fourth Amendment.
At the Supreme Court, Manuel argues that a post-arrest probable cause determination is subject to the same rules as a pre-arrest probable cause determination, meaning that if an officer arrests someone without a warrant and then uses false information to obtain a favorable probable cause determination, the officer violates the Fourth Amendment just as if he had obtained an arrest warrant on false information and had then arrested someone based on that warrant. Additionally, Manuel argues that the Court need not consider the Due Process Clause in this case because the Fourth Amendment applies and outweighs and the Due Process Clause in malicious prosecution claims. Finally, Manuel argues that he may bring his claim under § 1983 because he has alleged a violation of one of his constitutional rights.
In response, the City of Joliet first claims that Manuel cannot bring his claims because he filed them after the limitations period had expired. Further, it insists that the delayed accrual of a malicious prosecution claim, which would extend the limitations period beyond when Manuel filed, is incompatible with the Fourth Amendment and cannot save Manuel’s claim, because it requires the case to come out in favor of the defendant, whereas the outcome of a case is irrelevant to Fourth Amendment claims. Along with several other arguments, the City of Joliet also claims that while Manuel could have brought his claims under the Due Process Clause (had he pursued his claims before the limitation expired), he cannot bring his claim under the Fourth Amendment, because it involves procedure that took place after the prosecution started.
This case will clearly have a major impact on Elijah Manuel, but the Court’s holding here could also have a far-reaching impact on many people, as a decision in Manuel’s favor would expand Fourth Amendment rights. This would give many of those who have been abused by the prosecutorial system another way to pursue restitution for the deprivation of their constitutional rights. On that March night five years ago, Elijah Manuel likely had no intention to begin a campaign to impact the realm of constitutional rights, but later this term when the Court decides his case, his name may take on constitutional significance.
October 11
Samsung Electornics v. Apple
No. 15-777; Fed. Cir.
In 2007, Apple released the iPhone, and it quickly became a huge success. Samsung took note of this success and in 2010 began selling phones that looked very similar to the iPhone. In 2011, Apple sued Samsung for infringement, claiming that Samsung had infringed upon several of Apple’s design patents. Apple won the case, and Samsung appealed both the liability verdict and the damages award, but Samsung lost the appeal on both issues. Following its loss in the Federal Circuit, Samsung petitioned for certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted.
The issue on appeal is whether, when a design patent for a single component of a product is infringed, should damages for the infringement amount to all of the profits from the sale of the product, or should damages be limited to the amount of the infringing product’s profits that are attributable to the infringing component? The issue involves 35 U.S.C. § 289, which states that “[w]hoever during the term of a patent for a design, without license of the owner, (1) applies the patented design . . . to any article of manufacture for the purpose of sale, or (2) sells or exposes for sale any article of manufacture to which such design . . . has been applied shall be liable to the owner to the extent of his total profit.”
Samsung argues that damages should be limited to the amount of profits that are attributable to the infringing component. In this case, that would mean Samsung would only be liable for damages equal to the portion of the profit of the infringing phones that directly resulted from the infringing design. The portion of the profits that Samsung would have made without the infringing design would not be included in the damages award. Samsung argues the phrase “article of manufacture” in § 289 can refer to a component of a product, not just the product as a whole. It contends that another phrase from § 289 limits damages to profits directly attributable to infringement. Further, Samsung argues that the legislative history supports its interpretation of § 289, and it argues that if damages equaled total profits of a product as a whole, it would lead to disastrous consequences. For example, it insists that this interpretation would allow one who owns a patent for a cup holder to sue a car company who sells a car that infringes on the cup holder patent and to win damages amounting to all the profits of the sale of the car even though only the cup holder design infringed any patent. Based on the prospect of these kinds of damages and the text and history of the statute, Samsung asks the Court to limit damage awards to profits attributable to the infringing component of a product.
Apple, of course, argues that damages should equal total profits of the infringing product, not just the profit attributable to the infringing component. It explains that the phrase “total profit” § 289 means profit from the entire product and that, while “article of manufacture” can mean either a product as a whole or a component thereof, the interpretation of the phrase is a question of fact for the jury. The jury that decided this case at the trial level interpreted the phrase to mean the whole product, and Apple insists that the jury’s finding should be left alone. Apple also disputes Samsung’s contention that the case should at least be remanded for a new trial based on what Samsung claims was an error concerning jury instructions—Apple states that there was no error and that, even if there was, the error was harmless, so no remand is necessary. Finally, pushing back against Samsung’s argument that an affirmation could lead to disastrous consequences, Apple explains that the law has been interpreted Apple’s way for decades without these consequences and that legal procedures exist as safeguards to prevent some of the consequences about which Samsung warned.
The outcome of this case could mean big things for both patent owners and infringers. An affirmation would mean that infringers could be liable for very high damages if their product was successful on the market (the damages in this case, for example, were $399 million). An affirmation would almost certainly mean that infringers would be warier about using a patented component in a product because it, if sued, they could have to surrender all of their profits from that product, regardless of how small or minor a part of the product the infringing component was. On the other hand, if the Court holds that damages should be limited to profits attributable to the infringing component, not only will Samsung’s wallet be grateful, but also many companies that are sued for using a patented design in a complex product. Such a holding could also potentially incentivize companies to use patented designs in products if the company believed that overall profits from the product would greatly outweigh profits attributable to the infringing component.
Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado
No. 15-606; Colo.
A commonly held conception about Anglo-American law is that the sealed jury chamber is sacrosanct, with the content of deliberations protected from even the probing eye of the court itself. In one often referenced 18th Century case, the great English judge Lord Mansfield refused to allow a juror to testify about the process despite the jury having allegedly arrived at its verdict by simply drawing straws. The reality isn’t quite so clearly defined, however. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to trial by an impartial jury, and throughout American history courts have held that it is sometimes necessary to inquire into the content of jury deliberations in order to secure that right. The exception usually arises when some improper outside force has influenced a verdict, but in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, the Supreme Court will be called upon to determine if allegations of undisclosed racial bias will ever justify intruding into that most jealously guarded of spaces.
In 2007, Mexican immigrant Miguel Angel Peña-Rodriguez was working at a horse-racing track in Aurora, Colorado when a man attempted to sexually assault two teenage sisters in one of the track’s bathrooms. The girls escaped and informed their father, who notified authorities after he surmised from their description that Peña-Rodriguez was the assailant. Law enforcement arrested Peña-Rodriguez, and the girls both identified him when police later that night drove them by where he was being detained. Peña-Rodriguez was charged with felony attempted sexual assault on a minor, as well as with misdemeanor unlawful sexual contact and two misdemeanor counts of harassment.
At trial, Peña-Rodriguez’s lawyer argued that his client was the victim of mistaken identity, presenting as an alibi witness another Hispanic track worker who testified that Peña-Rodriguez was with him in one of the nearby barns at the time of the offense. The prosecution in turn presented the girls’ identification of Peña-Rodriguez and framed the controversy as a credibility judgement between the sisters and Peña-Rodriguez’s coworkers. After a protracted deliberation, the jury found Peña-Rodriguez guilty of the misdemeanors but could not come to a verdict on the felony charge.
Following the jury’s dismissal, however, two jurors approached Peña-Rodriguez’s lawyer to inform him that another juror had repeatedly made disparaging statements about Hispanics and immigrants during deliberations. The third juror, identified in court documents as H.C., had allegedly stated, among other things, that Peña-Rodriguez “did it because he’s Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they want.” He went on to elaborate that as a former law enforcement officer, his experience was that “Mexican men had a bravado that caused them to believe they could do whatever they wanted with women” and “nine times out of ten Mexican men were guilty of being aggressive toward women and young girls.” H.C. also said that he did not believe Peña-Rodriguez’s alibi witness because “he was ‘an illegal,’” notwithstanding the witness’s testimony that he was a lawful resident of the United States.
Peña-Rodriguez’s lawyer moved for a new trial based on revelations, but the trial judge held that the affidavits and testimony of the two jurors were not admissible under the Colorado Rules of Evidence. Like the Federal Rules of Evidence, Colorado’s Rule 606(b) prevents the introduction of any evidence regarding the content of jury deliberations during an inquiry into the validity of a verdict. Peña-Rodriguez appealed, arguing that excluding the evidence deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, but the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed in a closely divided decision. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on April 4, 2016.
The State now argues that Peña-Rodriguez’s right to an impartial jury could have been protected through other procedural mechanisms, and his failure to exercise them did not warrant overcoming the longstanding rule against juror testimony regarding deliberations. Indeed, the Colorado state judge warned Peña-Rodriguez’s lawyer prior to trial that the court had had problems in the past with vocally prejudiced jurors and suggested that the lawyer inquire into the matter during voir dire jury selection. Peña-Rodriguez’s lawyer did not ask any of the jurors about their racial biases, however, instead asking generalized questions about the juror’s ability to decide fairly and preconceived feelings she might have for the defendant.
In response, Peña-Rodriguez states that racial bias is insidious to the point that it cannot always feasibly be rooted out through jury selections, and a defendant’s interest in a fair trial outweighs any potential harassment or chilling of deliberations that might occur.
Whatever the Supreme Court decides, it will have repercussions far beyond Colorado’s state courts. The United States has filed an amaci brief in support of the state-respondent, for an adverse ruling limiting the reach of Colorado’s Rules of Evidence would apply equally to the Federal Rules on which they were based. Additionally, every state has some form of rule restricting the introduction of evidence of jury deliberations, though the specifics vary widely and Peña-Rodriguez argues that some would be unaffected by a ruling in his favor.
Manrique v. United States
No. 15-7250; 11th Cir.
In a month full of dense cases centering on obscure procedural matters, Manrique v. United States might strike an outside observer as the most Byzantine. Like the Buck v. Davis case set to be argued the previous week, Manrique involves a particularly heinous crime, but the jarring details of the offense that launched the case are tangential to the question before the Supreme Court. Indeed, Manrique might be characterized as a simple dispute over the administration of appeals in federal courts. Yet, as with many controversies over procedure, Manrique’s bureaucratic façade hides a much more divisive issue—namely, the separation of powers and the proper role of federal courts as defined by Congress.
In January 2014, a federal child pornography investigation led agents to the Florida home of Marcelo Manrique. When confronted, Marcelo confessed to downloading sexually explicit depictions of minors and consented to a search of his desktop computer, which revealed over 300 illegal files. Many of the images and videos depicted very young children being forced to engage in sexual acts with adults, and Manrique was promptly arrested. At trial, he quickly pled guilty to one count of illegal possession of the files.
At his initial sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Manrique to six years’ imprisonment and a life-time of supervised release. The presiding judge also stated that the law required Manrique to pay restitution to any identifiable victims, but an official order on the matter would be deferred because the amount of their losses had not yet been determined. The written judgement that was entered the following day listed the amount of restitution to be paid as $0.00 and included a note stating that it would be amended once damages were calculated. Two weeks later, Manrique filed a notice of appeal to the Eleventh Circuit challenging his sentence.
At a restitution hearing several months later, the prosecutor informed the court that only one of the children identified in the materials was interested in seeking restitution. Identified by the pseudonym of “Angela,” the girl had been the subject of forty-five images possessed by Manrique, which depicted her being sexually abused by her father. After receiving material detailing the extent of the hardship the images caused Angela and the cost of her ongoing treatment, the court ordered that Manrique pay to her $100 per image he possessed, totaling $4,500 in restitution.
On appeal before the Eleventh Circuit, Manrique challenged both his life term of supervised release and the restitution order, arguing that the government had not shown that he was the cause of Angela’s damages and had not substantiated the amount. The court considered and affirmed his life-time sentence of supervised release but dismissed the challenge to the restitution order, holding that they were barred from reviewing it because Manrique had appealed only the original judgement and not the subsequent order setting the amount of restitution. The notice of appeal was “jurisdictional” according to the court, meaning that it only had the power to entertain challenges to rulings that were appealed. Manrique could have challenged both aspects of his sentence by appealing only the second amended judgement or by appealing both judgements, the court explained, but a challenge to only the first judgement would not suffice.
The government now argues before the Supreme Court that this was the proper ruling because Congress, who is charged by the Constitution with defining and distributing the judicial power among the federal courts, authorized the Eleventh Circuit to hear appeals in only a limited number of circumstances. For it to hear Manrique’s challenge to the restitution sentence would not have simply been a matter of it excusing its own rules, but rather a grab at power to which it is not entitled. Manrique counters that the issue is not nearly as lofty and high-minded as the government wishes to portray it and instead is settled by a basic rule of appellate procedure: appeals that are filed after a decision is announced but before a judgement is entered are treated as if they were filed after the judgement. The Court will decide whether the separation of powers is implicated in the last case heard during its first sitting of the term, and in doing so will settle a question that has divided federal appeals courts across the country.
This post was authored by The George Washington Law Review Online Editorial Team.
