Case No. 17-765 | 6th Cir.
Preview by Madeline Greathouse
The issue to be resolved in United States v. Stitt is the definition of “burglary” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2018). The Court will be forced to consider whether burglary under Tennessee’s aggravated burglary statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-403 (2017), which expands the offense to unlawful invasions of vehicles adapted into dwellings, is consistent with the burglary that counts as an underlying offense in the ACCA.
The ACCA increases the penalties for felons in possession of firearms when they have three past convictions related to certain enumerated offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). One of these underlying offenses is burglary, which the ACCA originally defined as “unlawfully entering or remaining in a building with the intent to commit a crime.” Brief for Respondent at 1, United States v. Stitt, No. 17-765 (U.S. filed Aug. 14, 2018). Following a series of amendments, the definition of burglary was removed from the text of the ACCA in 1986. Id. at 8. Immediately thereafter, in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), the Court was forced to consider whether the ACCA’s treatment of burglary changed as a result of the removed language. In Taylor, the Supreme Court maintained that the removal of the definition did not signify a change in burglary’s meaning. 495 U.S. at 589–90.
The government claims that Taylor was determined at a time when the majority of state penal codes took expansive views on burglary: “‘[M]ost States’ had at least one burglary statute protecting . . . mobile or nonpermanent homes.” Reply Brief for the United States at 1–2, United States v. Stitt, No. 17-765 (U.S. filed Sept. 13, 2018). The government posits that Taylor must be considered in light of this fact and in consideration of burglary’s underlying meaning: invasion of someone’s home regardless of what form that home takes. The government argues that if the Court affirms the Sixth Circuit’s restrictive definition, it will be removing burglary as a viable underlying offense in the ACCA. As a result, the government seeks a reversal of the Sixth Circuit’s decision, which would allow the case to proceed using the expanded definition of burglary.
The respondent’s argument rests on the notion that Congress would have explicitly expanded the scope of burglary under the ACCA if that was its intent. Instead, the respondent argues, Congress provided no new definition of burglary and the Court accordingly continued to make rulings based on the belief that burglaries can only occur in buildings and not in vehicles. The respondent notes that there have been multiple congressional proposals to recodify burglary’s definition under the ACCA, and that none of these proposals deviated from the traditional view, even though the Model Penal Code and several state codes expanded their meanings of burglary during this time. The respondent further asserts that even if the Court supports expanding the definition of burglary under the ACCA, it should not do so to the same extent as Tennessee, which includes invasion of “places ‘appurtenant to’ buildings or vehicles” in its burglary definition. Brief for Respondent at 6 (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-14-401(1) (2017)). In the alternative, the respondent asserts that the ACCA violates his right to a jury trial by giving judges the discretion to adjust penalties based on factual determinations, which fall outside of their judicial scope of authority and are reserved for jury deliberation.
If the Court decides to explicitly address the issue of the definition of burglary, the Court’s decision will resolve a split within and across circuits. The Court’s decision will also effectively determine whether the respondent will be sentenced to a maximum of 10 years in prison or, under the ACCA, a minimum of 15 years. Stitt was consolidated with the related case of United States v. Sims, and will be heard on October 9th in an abbreviated format.