Case No. 17-1104 | 3d Cir.
Preview by Ian K. Bryant-Smith
This case seeks to resolve a circuit split regarding tort liability in admiralty law. In Lindstrom v. A-C Liability Trust, 424 F.3d 488 (6th Cir. 2005), the Sixth Circuit adopted a bright-line rule holding that a manufacturer may not be held liable for damage caused by materials added to a product by a third party. In In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation, 873 F.3d 232 (3d. Cir. 2017), the decision being appealed here, the Third Circuit adopted a fact-specific rule allowing manufacturers to be held liable for damage caused by materials added to a product by a third party if such an addition was reasonably foreseeable.
The respondents are the estates of two Navy sailors who were eventually diagnosed with cancer after being exposed to asbestos while working on Navy ships between the late 1950s and early 1980s. The petitioners are the manufacturers of shipboard equipment.
The equipment had internal parts made of asbestos, and also had to be insulated with asbestos surrounding it. The petitioners shipped the equipment with the internal asbestos, but the external asbestos was provided by the Navy. In addition, by the time the respondents were exposed to the equipment, even the internal asbestos had been replaced on numerous occasions by the Navy. Both the internal and external asbestos were necessary for the equipment to function properly, and the maintenance guide provided by the petitioners explained how to install it. Nothing in the materials provided by the petitioners indicated that asbestos was a hazard, even though it had been known that there were some dangers associated with asbestos as early at 1922.
The petitioners argue that traditional tort doctrine does not make manufacturers liable for materials that they did not produce, sell, or distribute. This would prevent them from being held liable for the asbestos, installed by the Navy, that made the respondents sick. There is no duty to protect others from harm done by third parties, they argue, and so they cannot be held responsible for the respondents developing cancer as a result of toxic substances that they did not provide. Further, they argue that the foreseeability-based test adopted by the Third Circuit is unworkable. The petitioners argue that requiring every manufacturer whose equipment might interact with asbestos to post a warning of its dangers would result in over-warning, especially on a ship where many systems are interconnected.
The respondents counter that the focus in determining liability should be on the conduct of the manufacturers rather than on their specific products. In this case, they argue, the petitioners clearly intended their equipment to be used with asbestos; it was shipped with internal asbestos already in place, and the maintenance guides provided guidance both for replacing the internal asbestos and for installing external asbestos. Because this intended use was known to be dangerous, the respondents argue, the petitioners had a duty to warn. The respondents further contend that the concept of foreseeability is far from an unworkable standard because it is at the core of common law tort doctrine and is used throughout maritime law. In order to keep admiralty law uniform, they contend, the fact-specific, foreseeability-based rule adopted by the Third Circuit should be affirmed.