Case No. 18-525 | 5th Cir.
Preview by Boseul (Jenny) Jeong, Online Editor
This case is about whether the administrative exhaustion requirement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a jurisdictional requirement or a waivable rule.
Davis, Respondent, had filed a religious discrimination and a retaliation claim against her employer, Fort Bend, the Petitioner. The district court granted Petitioner’s summary judgement motion and the Fifth Circuit reversed in part and remanded the religious discrimination claim. In the subsequent proceedings, Petitioner brought up an argument that Respondent had not exhausted administrative proceedings and thus the court did not have jurisdiction. The district court agreed with Petitioner and dismissed the case with prejudice. On subsequent appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded once again. This appeal followed.
Petitioner argues that Congress has the power to define the federal court’s jurisdiction according to the Constitution and when “fairly discernible” through the statute, Congress’s intention limits the district court’s jurisdiction. Petitioner argues that here, the “text, structure, and purpose” of Title VII, made Congress’s intention “fairly discernible.” Brief for Petitioner at 17, 18, Fort Bend Cty. v. Davis, No. 18-525 (U.S. filed Feb. 25, 2019) (quoting Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1, 8–10 (2012)). Petitioner pointed to the (1) “detailed,” “elaborate,” and “comprehensive” process specified in Title VII, (2) absence of exceptions in terms of administrative exhaustion, and (3) danger of undermining the purpose of Title VII, which is to promote “[c]ooperation and voluntary compliance” and to give the EEOC its primary role in combating workplace discrimination. Id. at 12 (citing Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1651 (2015)).
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that Congress’s “clear statement” is necessary to interpret a provision as a jurisdiction requirement. Respondent points to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), which requires a right-to-sue letter before suit, without explicit language or any reference to jurisdiction. The provision does not discuss the court’s authority, but rather describes a procedural obligation. Respondent also argues that no court has ruled that the “fairly discernible” standard is correct. Petitioner responds that the text, structure, and purpose still support their position under this standard because (1) the provision is under the statute’s “jurisdiction” caption; (2) the statute’s purpose is to promote “broader system-related goal[s],” id. at 14, (quoting John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133 (2008)); and (3) this Court has interpreted similar requirements in other statutes as a jurisdictional requirement.
Petitioner distinguished Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385 (1982), from this case because Zipes was about a statutory deadline and it is common to see both a nonjurisdictional timeliness provision and a jurisdictional exhaustion requirement in one statute. Respondent agreed that the case was not specifically about the exhaustion requirement. However, she argued that the reasoning actually confirms that the exhaustion is not a jurisdictional requirement. Additionally, she quoted the Court’s ruling that “Congress necessarily adopted the view that the provision for filing charges with the EEOC should not be construed to erect a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit” while ratifying a decision to award relief “to class members who had not exhausted administrative remedies before the EEOC.” Brief for Respondent at 23, Fort Bend Cty., No. 18-525 (U.S. filed Mar. 27, 2019) (quoting Zipes, 455 U.S. at 397).
There has been a circuit split on this question. Three circuits have held that administrative exhaustion is a jurisdictional requirement and eight circuits have held that it is subject to waiver. This decision will resolve the split.