Christopher Bruno · November 2008
77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 141 (2008)
This Note argues that courts should recognize a privacy right to decide not to be a legal father. Such a privacy right is derived from the right to procreative autonomy as already established by Griswold v. Connecticut, Eisenstadt v. Baird, Roe v. Wade, and their progeny. While considering policy is an important part of crafting constitutional doctrine, this Note maintains that policy should shape how a right is applied rather than whether a right exists. Therefore, although the right not to be a legal father has not been recognized in prior cases because of potential policy implications, this Note argues that courts should first find that a right exists and then determine how to apply it. Admittedly, applying the right not to be a legal father may be difficult, and the right might legitimately be outweighed by policy interests and competing constitutional rights; however, this Note suggests that men seeking relief from child support payments after having expressed preconception a desire not to father a child might be able to enforce this right.
