Case No. 18-6943 | 5th Cir.
Preview by Megan Walden
In this case, the Court will determine whether a Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rules”) Rule 59(e) motion involving a habeas claim should be treated as a successive habeas petition under Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005).
In Gonzalez, the Supreme Court determined that a Federal Rule 60(b) relief from judgment motion that challenges a court’s previous judgment on a habeas claim or adds a new habeas claim should be treated as a successive habeas petition. The Fourth, Fifth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits have extended Gonzalez to Rule 59(e) motions to alter or amend a judgment, reasoning that this approach prevents petitioners from relitigating claims that district courts have already considered on their merits. The Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have declined to extend Gonzalez to Rule 59(e) motions, reasoning that Rule 59(e) was designed to allow courts to correct their own errors before appeal, thereby avoiding unnecessary reversals and unfair results. These differences in approach have led to some confusion among habeas petitioners.
In 2002, Gregory Dean Banister was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and sentenced to thirty years imprisonment. In 2014, Banister filed a habeas petition challenging his detention, raising more than fifty claims. The district court denied Banister’s petition on the merits and denied a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”).
Less than thirty days later, Banister filed a timely Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the district court’s judgement on the petition. The district court denied Banister’s motion to amend.
Thirty days later, but more than sixty days after the habeas petition’s initial denial, Banister filed a notice of appeal and an application for a COA in the district court. After the district court again considered and denied his application for a COA, Banister filed a timely application for a COA with the Fifth Circuit.
The Fifth Circuit determined that Banister’s notice of appeal was not timely because it was filed more than thirty days after the judgment and denied a COA based on jurisdiction. The Fifth Circuit noted that although Banister had filed a timely 59(e) motion, the motion was really as a successive habeas petition under Gonzalez. Therefore, unlike a typical Rule 59(e) motion, Banister’s motion did not toll the time for appeal. The Fifth Circuit determined that Banister therefore had missed his opportunity to appeal the denial of his habeas petition by waiting for judgement on the 59(e) motion.
Banister, appearing pro se, will argue that extending Gonzalez to 59(e) motions will lead to error, unfair results and even greater confusion among pro se petitioners, who reasonably will not expect the Federal Rules to contain unwritten exceptions for habeas petitions. The Government will argue that the Court’s reasoning regarding Rule 60(b) in Gonzalez applies equally to Rule 59(e) and that the extension of Gonzalez promotes efficiency in the courts.