The Unconscionably Short Warranty

A typical consumer product warranty covers products for defects that appear before the warranty period expires. If the manufacturer warrants a vehicle for five years or 60,000 miles, whichever occurs first, problems that require repairs after the warranty period expires are outside the warranty and, therefore, the buyer’s problem. Advocates for consumers have developed a theory to escape the claim-barring consequence of expiration of the warranty period. They have argued with some success that the warranty period that would otherwise bar their claim is unconscionable and thus unenforceable under Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) section 2-302. The warranty period term, they contend, is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable because the manufacturer knew and failed to disclose the risk that the defect would appear only after the warranty period expired. In effect, the manufacturer has exploited its superior knowledge of the product and market power to impose a warranty period term that unconscionably shifted the risk of product failure to the consumer.

This Article considers this theory of the unconscionably short warranty period. It explains how UCC Article 2 and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act recognize and regulate the use of warranty period terms to limit the duration of express and implied warranties on consumer products. It explains the development of the unconscionably short warranty theory and critiques the Fourth Circuit’s key decision that recognized it in Carlson v. General Motors. It argues that the unconscionably short warranty theory is an inappropriate use of section 2-302 to circumvent the pleading and proof requirements necessary for a tort or statutory cause of action against a consumer product manufacturer for fraudulent misrepresentation by nondisclosure in bargaining.