Case No. 16-534 | 7th Cir. Decision
How do you get justice against the Iranian government in an American court? In recent years, Congress has provided more avenues for families of terror victims to collect on judgments against nations that sponsor terrorist attacks. In Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the Court will decide whether those statutory avenues for collecting on judgments allow petitioners to attach the judgment to and seize precious Iranian antiquities.
The petitioners’ suit arises out of a 1997 suicide bombing, sponsored by Iran, of a pedestrian mall in Jerusalem. In 2003, the District Court for the District of Columbia awarded plaintiffs $71.5 million in damages. After Iran failed to pay, the petitioners sought to collect on the judgment in the Northern District of Illinois, seeking to attach the judgment to Persian artifacts belonging to Iran and housed at the Field Museum of Natural History and the University of Chicago’s Oriental Institute.
The case turns on the interpretation of a provision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). In 2008, Congress amended FSIA to include a terrorism-related exception to foreign sovereign immunity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) (2012). Petitioners contend that § 1610(g) is a freestanding exception that allows creditors to attach property regardless of whether it meets another exception in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). The district court rejected their argument, holding that the provision allows plaintiffs to attach the property of a terrorism sponsor’s agents or instrumentalities, but only if the property meets the criteria of a separate statutory exception to foreign sovereign immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, creating a split with the Ninth Circuit, which had held that § 1610(g) does create a freestanding exception enlarging plaintiffs’ ability to attach the property of foreign sovereigns in terrorism-related cases. See Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 825 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2016).
As might be expected for a question of statutory interpretation, the parties’ arguments boil down to dueling assertions about the statutory text, its purpose, and legislative history. Petitioners argue that Congress intended to except all property of state sponsors of terrorism from sovereign immunity, and the law should be construed expansively to achieve its purpose. Moreover, because the law only applies to the handful of nations listed by the State Department as sponsors of terrorism, petitioners argue that the interests of terrorism victims should outweigh international comity concerns.
By contrast, Iran reads § 1610(g) to be far narrower in scope. Iran hones in on the language in the statute allowing attachment “as providing in [section 1610]” to show that the intent was for § 1610(g) to attach to the other exceptions in § 1610. Iran argues that, while the provision allows plaintiffs to reach the property of foreign sovereigns, they may only do so if the property fits under a separate statutory exception to immunity, such as the exception for property involved in commercial activity. Additionally, Iran argues that petitioners’ reading of the provision as a freestanding separate exception to sovereign immunity would render the amendments that Congress made to the existing exceptions when it enacted § 1610(g) surplus. Moreover, Iran argues, Petitioners’ expansive reading would run against the typically restrictive construction of exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity and violate international standards, which limit exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity to commercial property.
The case places the United States in a delicate position between the victims of Iran-sponsored terrorism and other nations concerned about the ramifications of a decision subjecting Iran’s U.S.-based property to attachment. In any event, fears about possible international blowback appear to have won out: The government has filed an amicus brief in support of Iran’s position.